The new report issued in terms of money-laundering schemes associated with casino gambling in British Columbia raised some questions on the respond of the former Liberal Government of the province to the schemes which might have resulted in 'washing' a massive amount of dirty money obtained illegally. VANCOUVER — Vast amounts of cash started flowing into British Columbia's largest casino in 2010 and transactions of $800,000 or more became common as players hauled in bags, suitcases. Commissioner Austin Cullen is overseeing an inquiry into money laundering in British Columbia. THE CANADIAN PRESS/Darryl Dyck Testimony at the Cullen Commission, which is examining money laundering.
At 9:30 PDT this morning (June 27, 2018) BC Attorney General David Eby QC convened a press conference to discuss the release of the much anticipated report by Peter German QC. Minister Eby was joined by German, a classic quadruple threat. Quite boring really. Lawyer (BC and Ont), former RCMP member of 31 years, Correctional Service Regional Deputy Commissioner, money laundering expert and textbook writer, PhD, and Queen's Counsel. He does not, so far as we know, hold any Olympic medals, important medical patents or Eurovision victories.
Those who tuned in to the live stream, as I did, were given a summary rundown of the astonishing links between BC's broken regulation of casinos, the absurd Vancouver real estate market, and the devastating opioid crisis.
The 'Vancouver Model' of money laundering revealed in the report is a trailer of BC's shame, although this was not the first we have heard of it. The BC AG had appeared in Ottawa a few months back to sound the alarm before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance.
But few had seen the actual report until today.
It is somewhat edited, we are told, by German himself to assure necessary privacy considerations, but it is now shared on the BC Government's news portal (posted at the same time as the conference): https://news.gov.bc.ca/files/German_Gaming_Final_Report.pdf
The report was not searchable, however this version is: https://www.scribd.com/document/382738528/German-Gaming-Final-Report-OCR
Highlights of the Report and Press Conference
Recommendations of the report
I'm using the term 'casinos' instead of 'service provider', but basically these are the Great Canadian Gaming Corporation, Gateway Casinos & Entertainment, and Paragon Gaming.
The report recommends:
Gaming in BC
R1 – Gaming Control Act (B.C.) be amended to facilitate the recommendations in the report.
R2 – GCA clearly delineate the roles and responsibilities of BCLC and the regulator, the Gaming Policy & Enforcement Branch.
Crown Corporation – BCLC
R3 – BCLC in concert with casinos and regulator, annually review the source of funds declarations (to see if adjustments are needed).
R4 T- BCLC remind casinos not to accept cash if they are not satisfied with a source of funds declaration.
Federal Reporting
R5 – make casinos responsible for completing reports to FinTRAC, including STRs (suspicious transaction reports).
R6 – discuss with FinTRAC how to get casinos to directly report to them, or at least how to get BCLC to do this.
R7 – BCLC provide Corporate STRs if its files contain relevant information not contained within an STR from a casino.
R8 – casinos develop the necessary capacity to assess risk and perform due diligence on suspicious transactions.
R9 – casinos copy STRs to BCLC, the regulator and a new designated policing unit (DPU), and the RCMP.
R10 – the regulator/DPU have access to iTRAK in its offices.
Provincial Reporting
R11 – eliminate existing 'suspicious currency transaction' and 'unusual financial transaction' reporting.
R12 – develop a Transaction Analysis Team to review all suspicious transaction reports.
R13 – weekly meetings for the Transaction Analysis Team to review all suspicious transaction reports and develop strategies to deal with each.
Joint Integrated Gaming Investigation Team (JIGIT)
R14 – provide JIGIT with support for its investigative mandates.
R15 – consider transitioning JIGIT to a permanent, fenced funding model within the RCMP's provincial budget.
BCLC Goes Undercover
R16 – stop BCLC from doing undercover operations, except in conjunction with the regulator and, or the police.
Software Debacle
R17 – stop BCLC from spending money on the SAS AML software system.
Very Important Patrons
R18 – BCLC ensure that VIP hosts do not handle cash or chips.
R19 – those working in VIP rooms get an independent avenue to report incidents of inappropriate conduct by patrons.
Cash Alternatives and Cash Limits
R20 – make cash alternatives the responsibility of the casinos, subject to their compliance with overarching standards.
R21 – don't impose cash limits on buy-ins.
R22 – eliminate patron gaming fund accounts once responsibility for cash alternatives is transitioned to casinos.
Chips Go Walking Bijoux geant casino plan de campagne.
R23 – BCLC implement a chip tracking system for casinos.
Standards-Based Industry
R24 – transition casino industry to a standards-based model.
R25 – develop standards-based model via cross-sector of industry and government, building on Ontario Standards.
R26 – make the CEO / Registrar of the regulator be the keeper of the standards.
A New Regulator
R27 – transition to an independent regulator in the form of a Service Delivery Crown Corporation, with a Board of Directors and a CEO / Registrar
R28 – have the regulator's board be a governance board and not be responsible for appeals from decisions of the Registrar.
R29 – regulatory investigators to be Special Provincial Constables.
R30 – make anti-money laundering and mandatory training a responsibility of the Regulator (re front line gaming personnel, VIP hosts).
R31 – make Regulator the regulator of BCLC and make BCLC Board, officers and employees be subject to registration.
R32 – have Regulator provide a 24/7 presence in the major Lower Mainland casinos, until a designated policing unit is in place.
R33 – appeals from Registrar decisions to be sent to an administrative tribunal constituted for this purpose, or already in existence.
R34 – fund Regulator from gaming revenue still.
R35 – ensure Regulator has dedicated in-house counsel.
R36 – hire Regulator investigators to meet core competencies.
Gaming Police
R37 – create Designated Policing Unit to specialize in criminal and regulatory investigations in legal gaming industry, with an emphasis on Lower Mainland casinos.
R38 – make DPU an integral part of the Regulator.
R39 – DPU not responsible for investigating illegal gaming outside casinos.
R40 – provide DPU with an Intelligence Unit.
R41 – study OPP Casino Bureau and the Nevada GCB Enforcement Division to determine an appropriate role for the DPU.
R42 – make anti-money laundering a specific responsibility of the DPU.
R43 – fund DPU from gaming revenue.
R44 – ensure Provincial prosecution service has prosecution counsel familiar with gaming law.
Vulnerable Sectors
R45 – undertake research into allegations of organized crime penetration of the real estate industry.
R46 – consider a licencing and recording regime for money service businesses, similar to the Metal Dealers Recycling Act.
R47 – consider researching the vulnerability of the luxury car sector and the horse racing sector to organized crime.
R48 – continue to encourage the federal government to amend the POCMLTFA to broaden the entities subject to reporting, specifically luxury goods of interest to organized crime.
The interim recommendations
The report includes letters German earlier sent to the AG Eby in late November 2017 and in March 2018 with interim recommendations:
- Require Gaming Service Providers to declare source of funds for cash deposits over $10,000, and include ID, financial institution and account of source money.
- Put a Gaming Policy and Enforcement Branch investigator on shift 24/7 at high volume casinos.
- Appear before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance
Security footage: bags and stacks of dirty money
Some of this stuff looks like a poorly shot Guy Ritchie homage. Bags of dirty cash, in bricks of $10,000, wrapped with elastic bands, run into the casino by 'smurfs' and dumped at the teller's cage. As German himself makes clear, these are definitely not banking kosher.
Video released along with a new money laundering report shows bags of $20 bills being carried into a B.C. casino. More here: https://t.co/Vxq6D4M9hkpic.twitter.com/y45NAL9mto
— CTV Vancouver (@CTVVancouver) June 27, 2018
Jesus –> David Eby shows video of $500,000 in bundles of $20 bills held by elastic bands like drug dealers use, being taken out of plastic grocery bags being laundered by 2 guys at River Rock Casino. #moneylaundering
— Christine Duhaime (@cduhaime) June 27, 2018
In the Dirty Money report, at paras. 433-434, we get this less than sterling example of enforcement from an old Gaming Policy and Enforcement Branch report:
A GPEB investigator reported that in September 2010, a patron entered the Starlight casino with $3.1 million, of which $2.6 million was in $20 denominations, bundled in bricks of $10,000, wrapped with an elastic band at either end and carried in inexpensive plastic bags. The same patron made numerous other buy-ins, always with used currency. Sometimes he left the casino and returned minutes later with another bag of cash. He was known to associate with individuals who had previously been involved in loan sharking.
On November 24, 2010, GPEB wrote a letter to BCLC expressing concern over the September 2010 buy-in. Despite having filed an STR on the transaction, BCLC responded
that the patron's buy-in patterns 'does not meet the criteria that would indicate he is actively laundering money in British Columbia casinos.'
Praise for journalists
Peter German and Minister Eby both praised the work of journalists.
German thanks reporters who 'doggedly pursued' stories of money laundering over the past decade, mentioning by name @scoopercooper and @KathyTGlobe
— Jon Woodward (@ctv_jon) June 27, 2018
It's about policy and regulatory reform, but no public inquiry at this time
Seeing that the 'Vancouver Model' is a term touting an especially profitable and bespoke money laundering strategy developed in BC, it comes as no surprise that BC's approach to enforcement is hardly the beacon other jurisdictions turn to for enforcement wisdom.
German recounts an exchange with Nevada authorities at para 872 of the report:
I met with the Deputy Chief of the Enforcement Division, who heads the Las Vegas office, as well as with one of the investigators. I hypothesized that a box of cash arrived with rubber
bands at a cash cage. What would occur? The officers doubted that this would occur in Las Vegas, although it might have happened in the past. Today, their expectation is that the
casino will contact the on-duty enforcement agent, who would attend at the casino and deal with the suspicious money.
Attorney General Eby spoke to the need for a new casino regulator, one with dedicated police agents, and stricter reporting of suspicious cash transactions. But when it came to questions over commencing a full public inquiry launched by the government, Minister Eby noted that those are long processes and that this is a matter of urgency.
I noted this:
It's clear that the @Dave_Eby and Peter German strategy is to steer entirely away from scapegoating the individual people in charge of the various agencies/orgs and point towards rehabilitating the system at a policy and restructuring level.
— Nate Russell (@nrusse) June 27, 2018
Stages of money laundering
Money laundering is usually divided into three stages:
R6 – discuss with FinTRAC how to get casinos to directly report to them, or at least how to get BCLC to do this.
R7 – BCLC provide Corporate STRs if its files contain relevant information not contained within an STR from a casino.
R8 – casinos develop the necessary capacity to assess risk and perform due diligence on suspicious transactions.
R9 – casinos copy STRs to BCLC, the regulator and a new designated policing unit (DPU), and the RCMP.
R10 – the regulator/DPU have access to iTRAK in its offices.
Provincial Reporting
R11 – eliminate existing 'suspicious currency transaction' and 'unusual financial transaction' reporting.
R12 – develop a Transaction Analysis Team to review all suspicious transaction reports.
R13 – weekly meetings for the Transaction Analysis Team to review all suspicious transaction reports and develop strategies to deal with each.
Joint Integrated Gaming Investigation Team (JIGIT)
R14 – provide JIGIT with support for its investigative mandates.
R15 – consider transitioning JIGIT to a permanent, fenced funding model within the RCMP's provincial budget.
BCLC Goes Undercover
R16 – stop BCLC from doing undercover operations, except in conjunction with the regulator and, or the police.
Software Debacle
R17 – stop BCLC from spending money on the SAS AML software system.
Very Important Patrons
R18 – BCLC ensure that VIP hosts do not handle cash or chips.
R19 – those working in VIP rooms get an independent avenue to report incidents of inappropriate conduct by patrons.
Cash Alternatives and Cash Limits
R20 – make cash alternatives the responsibility of the casinos, subject to their compliance with overarching standards.
R21 – don't impose cash limits on buy-ins.
R22 – eliminate patron gaming fund accounts once responsibility for cash alternatives is transitioned to casinos.
Chips Go Walking Bijoux geant casino plan de campagne.
R23 – BCLC implement a chip tracking system for casinos.
Standards-Based Industry
R24 – transition casino industry to a standards-based model.
R25 – develop standards-based model via cross-sector of industry and government, building on Ontario Standards.
R26 – make the CEO / Registrar of the regulator be the keeper of the standards.
A New Regulator
R27 – transition to an independent regulator in the form of a Service Delivery Crown Corporation, with a Board of Directors and a CEO / Registrar
R28 – have the regulator's board be a governance board and not be responsible for appeals from decisions of the Registrar.
R29 – regulatory investigators to be Special Provincial Constables.
R30 – make anti-money laundering and mandatory training a responsibility of the Regulator (re front line gaming personnel, VIP hosts).
R31 – make Regulator the regulator of BCLC and make BCLC Board, officers and employees be subject to registration.
R32 – have Regulator provide a 24/7 presence in the major Lower Mainland casinos, until a designated policing unit is in place.
R33 – appeals from Registrar decisions to be sent to an administrative tribunal constituted for this purpose, or already in existence.
R34 – fund Regulator from gaming revenue still.
R35 – ensure Regulator has dedicated in-house counsel.
R36 – hire Regulator investigators to meet core competencies.
Gaming Police
R37 – create Designated Policing Unit to specialize in criminal and regulatory investigations in legal gaming industry, with an emphasis on Lower Mainland casinos.
R38 – make DPU an integral part of the Regulator.
R39 – DPU not responsible for investigating illegal gaming outside casinos.
R40 – provide DPU with an Intelligence Unit.
R41 – study OPP Casino Bureau and the Nevada GCB Enforcement Division to determine an appropriate role for the DPU.
R42 – make anti-money laundering a specific responsibility of the DPU.
R43 – fund DPU from gaming revenue.
R44 – ensure Provincial prosecution service has prosecution counsel familiar with gaming law.
Vulnerable Sectors
R45 – undertake research into allegations of organized crime penetration of the real estate industry.
R46 – consider a licencing and recording regime for money service businesses, similar to the Metal Dealers Recycling Act.
R47 – consider researching the vulnerability of the luxury car sector and the horse racing sector to organized crime.
R48 – continue to encourage the federal government to amend the POCMLTFA to broaden the entities subject to reporting, specifically luxury goods of interest to organized crime.
The interim recommendations
The report includes letters German earlier sent to the AG Eby in late November 2017 and in March 2018 with interim recommendations:
- Require Gaming Service Providers to declare source of funds for cash deposits over $10,000, and include ID, financial institution and account of source money.
- Put a Gaming Policy and Enforcement Branch investigator on shift 24/7 at high volume casinos.
- Appear before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance
Security footage: bags and stacks of dirty money
Some of this stuff looks like a poorly shot Guy Ritchie homage. Bags of dirty cash, in bricks of $10,000, wrapped with elastic bands, run into the casino by 'smurfs' and dumped at the teller's cage. As German himself makes clear, these are definitely not banking kosher.
Video released along with a new money laundering report shows bags of $20 bills being carried into a B.C. casino. More here: https://t.co/Vxq6D4M9hkpic.twitter.com/y45NAL9mto
— CTV Vancouver (@CTVVancouver) June 27, 2018
Jesus –> David Eby shows video of $500,000 in bundles of $20 bills held by elastic bands like drug dealers use, being taken out of plastic grocery bags being laundered by 2 guys at River Rock Casino. #moneylaundering
— Christine Duhaime (@cduhaime) June 27, 2018
In the Dirty Money report, at paras. 433-434, we get this less than sterling example of enforcement from an old Gaming Policy and Enforcement Branch report:
A GPEB investigator reported that in September 2010, a patron entered the Starlight casino with $3.1 million, of which $2.6 million was in $20 denominations, bundled in bricks of $10,000, wrapped with an elastic band at either end and carried in inexpensive plastic bags. The same patron made numerous other buy-ins, always with used currency. Sometimes he left the casino and returned minutes later with another bag of cash. He was known to associate with individuals who had previously been involved in loan sharking.
On November 24, 2010, GPEB wrote a letter to BCLC expressing concern over the September 2010 buy-in. Despite having filed an STR on the transaction, BCLC responded
that the patron's buy-in patterns 'does not meet the criteria that would indicate he is actively laundering money in British Columbia casinos.'
Praise for journalists
Peter German and Minister Eby both praised the work of journalists.
German thanks reporters who 'doggedly pursued' stories of money laundering over the past decade, mentioning by name @scoopercooper and @KathyTGlobe
— Jon Woodward (@ctv_jon) June 27, 2018
It's about policy and regulatory reform, but no public inquiry at this time
Seeing that the 'Vancouver Model' is a term touting an especially profitable and bespoke money laundering strategy developed in BC, it comes as no surprise that BC's approach to enforcement is hardly the beacon other jurisdictions turn to for enforcement wisdom.
German recounts an exchange with Nevada authorities at para 872 of the report:
I met with the Deputy Chief of the Enforcement Division, who heads the Las Vegas office, as well as with one of the investigators. I hypothesized that a box of cash arrived with rubber
bands at a cash cage. What would occur? The officers doubted that this would occur in Las Vegas, although it might have happened in the past. Today, their expectation is that the
casino will contact the on-duty enforcement agent, who would attend at the casino and deal with the suspicious money.
Attorney General Eby spoke to the need for a new casino regulator, one with dedicated police agents, and stricter reporting of suspicious cash transactions. But when it came to questions over commencing a full public inquiry launched by the government, Minister Eby noted that those are long processes and that this is a matter of urgency.
I noted this:
It's clear that the @Dave_Eby and Peter German strategy is to steer entirely away from scapegoating the individual people in charge of the various agencies/orgs and point towards rehabilitating the system at a policy and restructuring level.
— Nate Russell (@nrusse) June 27, 2018
Stages of money laundering
Money laundering is usually divided into three stages:
- 'Wash cycle', or placement stage, where dirty money is put into a financial vehicle.
- 'Spin cycle', or the layering stage, where money is moved through other vehicles by purchasing precious metals, fancy cars, through offshore trusts and 'brass plate' banks, and… of course, real estate. 'Intermediaries, including lawyers, wittingly or not, may be used as conduits for many of the foregoing schemes.'
- 'Drycycle', or integration stage, that puts the funds back into the legitimate economy.
Role of lawyers: victims and gatekeepers
German upholds the regulatory efforts of the Law Society of BC, and gives it credit for keeping its own house in order. But the independence of lawyers to run trust accounts under the protection of solicitor client privilege is targeted.
German says, at para. 971:
Without question, the absence of reporting by lawyers to FinTRAC is a gap in Canada's AML regime and is a significant impediment to police investigations […]. Canada is an outlier, as other common law jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom, have robust provisions in place which require financial reporting by lawyers. Although not an answer to the issue, the Law Society of B.C. is leading the way in terms of self-regulation of lawyers and has extensive policy in place regarding lawyers receiving and recording cash transactions.
– Find Nate Russell on Twitter
A saleswoman shows customers an Aston Martin at a luxury car dealership in Vancouver, British Columbia on October 10, 2015. Sales of expensive cars and export to China have jumped and is being tied to money laundering (Julie Gordon/Reuters)
Money laundering definition from the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) : the process used to disguise the source of money or assets derived from criminal activity. There are generally three stages in the process:
- -Placement: involves placing the proceeds of crime in the financial system;
- -Layering: involves converting the proceeds of crime into another form and creating complex layers of financial transactions to disguise the audit trail and the source and ownership of funds (e.g., the buying and selling of stocks, commodities or property); and,
- -Integration: involves placing the laundered proceeds back in the economy under a veil of legitimacy. (FINTRAC)
Last year an international investigation led by Peter German, former deputy commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, estimated that British Columbia's casinos were being used to launder up to $1 billion annually. The report suggested the money was coming primarily from Asian crime groups who then invested in expensive Vancouver and area real estate.
B.C. Attorney General David Eby (background) and investigator Peter German at the release of German's report, Dirty Money, in Vancouver, June 27, 2018, into money laundering at B.C casinos, German's latest report looks at laundering through exotic car purchase and export. (Yvette Brend/CBC
Casinos- now luxury cars
Suddenly Vancouver has also become a North American hotbed for extremely expensive exotic cars.
Now investigator Peter German has found the loophole. While large scale transactions involving cash raise alarms, this has not been the case for vehicle sales, including super exotic cars where dealers are not required to report large transactions to FINTRAC.
B.C. Attorney General David Eby noted in a news conference about the findings said ,'In the luxury-car market, there is no financial reporting of large cash purchases, no oversight of international bank wire transfers and no apparent investigation or enforcement. The report also uncovered a complicated luxury-vehicle export scheme.'
Sales of exotic cars have skyrocketed in Vancouver and at other exotic dealerships elsewhere in the province. Provincial sates tax is returned to buyers if the car is not be licensed in B.C. such as if it is exported. Last year $28 million in tax was rebated to buyers who quickly exported the cars, mainly to China.(Christina Low)
Criminals use straw buyers who sometimes bring bags of cash for vehicle purchase or non-identifiable bank drafts, from small amounts of international wire transfers sent to multiple bank accounts., Perhaps surprisingly, a story in the Vancouver Sun noted that some of the so-called straw buyers were not able to speak English.
The vehicle then is turned over to the 'real' buyer who may then resell to an exporter who ships it offshore, usually to China.
The Lamborghini Aventador SVJ on display at the Auto Exotica exhibit of the 2019 Canadian International AutoShow. Dealers at the show say sales have been kicked into overdrive in the last 3 years, from a few hundred to thousands, often to ‘well healed newcomers' (Philip Lee-Shanok/CBC
Adding insult to injury, once the car is sold abroad, the seller can apply for a rebate on the provincial sales tax. (PST) which on an expensive car can mean a huge sum is returned to the buyer.
Huge increase in exports and rebates given
Bc Casino Money Laundering Reporting
German's report notes that prior to 2014, PST rebates were fewer than 100. That jumped to over 700 in the following two years, then to over 3,600 in 2016. Last year the number of rebates give for luxury and exotic cars exported was over 4,400. The rebates total $85 million since 2013, with $28 million of that in 2018.
The report indicates several buyers have made multiple purchases and rebate requests.
The 300 page report is the second portion of investigator Peter German's look into money laundering in British Columbia. Last June his 'Dirty Money' report found substantial money laundering through the province's casinos.
Video released by B.C's attorney general shows casino customers bringing in bags of cash to one of B.C.'s casinos in an apparent act of money laundering. (B.C. attorney general)
British Columbia is now studying the report towards developing new rules, however coordination at the federal level would also be required
German's full report will include money laundering and the real-estate market in the province.
Additional information-sources
Bc Casino Money Laundering Report Template
Tags: Asia, Canada, cars, China, exotic, expenisive, luxury, money laundering, organized crime
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